Since the advent of nuclear weapons in 1945, a fragile peace has been maintained among the major nuclear powers, sustained by the fear of mutually assured destruction.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), negotiated in 1968, saw nuclear have-nots commit to nonproliferation in exchange for assurances of disarmament by nuclear-armed states. For the past five decades, this arrangement, predicated on the non-use of nuclear weapons, has served as a cornerstone of the global nuclear order. And that order has helped the international community respond to a series of proliferation challenges through both sanctions and diplomacy.
Of late, unfortunately, this order has come under significant strain and is facing a serious stress test.
The resurgence of rivalry among major powers has poisoned the political climate, leading to a weakening of international responses to ongoing proliferation challenges, such as those posed by North Korea and Iran. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has dealt two de
vastating blows to the very foundations of the present nuclear order. First, Russia, one of the two nuclear superpowers, is explicitly and repeatedly threatening to use nuclear weapons to deter any country from intervening on Ukraine’s side. This preemptive nuclear blackmail against non-nuclear states in a conventional conflict is a direct affront to the long-held norm of nuclear non-use (except for defensive purposes). More concerning is the perceived success of this blackmail, which may encourage other nuclear-haves to emulate. Second, the security assurances given to Ukraine by the United States in return for giving up nuclear weapons have proved futile. This will make it much harder to dissuade any potential aggressor from going nuclear.
These two blows have seriously weakened the nuclear taboo and boosted the salience of nuclear weapons in the nuclear posture and planning of not only nuclear haves, but also nuclear have-nots including U.S. allies under its nuclear umbrella. We are even witnessing uncomf
ortable spikes in public opinion polls of some countries, in particular South Korea, in support of acquiring their own nuclear weapons. If left unchecked, the risk of a nuclear domino effect could materialize in Northeast Asia, ultimately jeopardizing the fate of the NPT.
We must prevent this doomsday scenario. But we do not have a lot of time left. The next two years will be critical. Without tangible action, New START, the last remaining nuclear arms reduction instrument between the U.S. and Russia, will expire in February 2026. Unless it is renewed, the next NPT review process scheduled for later the same year will likely fail to produce any tangible outcomes three times in a row, which would be an unprecedented outcome in and of itself. Continuing with business as usual will only hasten its collapse, marking the onset of a perilous era of nuclear disorder.
Our diagnosis must be based on this sober and rather pessimistic reality. But we cannot and should not bring ourselves down by staying pessimistic. W
e must be optimistic in our action. Otherwise we cannot steer our future in the direction we want.
The first onus of action is on the United States. Without U.S. leadership, nuclear order cannot be restored. The U.S. must reach out to China and convince Beijing to raise the priority of restoring nuclear order on its national agenda. The recent resumption of the U.S.-China dialogue is a positive development, but they have a long way to go. They should focus on the fundamental principles of nuclear order, in which they have common interests. This can include the reaffirmation of nuclear non-use and the disapproval of nuclear blackmail. The track record of the U.S. administrations after President Barack Obama has been disappointing, as the momentum created by the Nuclear Security Summit was lost. With China’s President Xi Jinping consolidating his power throughout his third term, it is hard to expect any substantial progress without sustained engagement at the top level. The common understanding between the two
on key principles of nuclear order will provide a good basis for the five recognized nuclear powers (N5) to work on a blueprint for nuclear disarmament.
This top-down work can be complemented with Track 2 or Track 1.5 efforts involving think tanks and civic organizations. Earlier this week an international Track 2 dialogue took place in Seoul with experts from the U.S., China, Korea, Japan and Australia. This dialogue hosted by the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network, helped the experts understand each other’s positions better and will eventually contribute to guiding their governments toward a consensus later on.
Korea faces the tough task of navigating the sober reality of impending nuclear disorder for security. To that end, Korea must re-examine its security posture, including extended and integrated deterrence from scratch and find a path forward within the bounds of the NPT. We should not and cannot be a pariah in the global nuclear order.
Kim Won-soo (wsk4321@gmail.com)
is the former under-secretary-general of the United Nations and high representative for disarmament. As a Korean diplomat, he served as secretary to the ROK president for foreign affairs as well as for international security. He is now the chair of the international advisory board of the Taejae Academy (Future Consensus Institute) and a chair professor at Kyung Hee University.
Source: Yonhap News Agency